Conclusion: Qualities are monadic universals which exist without
reference to parts or anything else, which need not be instantiated in
particular objects, but rather exist as abstract potentialities.
“A quality is a mere abstract potentiality…considered as a monad (85-7).”
Premises
1.
Qualities are independent of mind in the form of
sense or thought.
a.
Consider a red object in the dark.
b.
Its ability to transmit certain light (and thus
to be perceived red) does not change because the darkness prevents this light
from being perceived. Redness is therefore independent of its being sensed.
c.
To think otherwise, is to hold one of two
positions, both of which still admit sense-independence: either that the body
assumes opposite properties upon these conditions, or that its properties are
indeterminate.
i.
In the former case, to ascribe opposite
properties to a substance under these conditions (such that, for example, a red
object in the dark would absorb, rather than reflect red light) is still to
believe that objects have sense-independent qualities, albeit ones for “which there
is no ground for believing in (85).”
ii.
The latter case, the belief that bodies become
indeterminate regarding qualities not perceived, is to admit the existence of
generals (universals), and therefore, to be consistent, the existence of qualities
independent of their particular instantiation.
1.
The majority of qualities inherent in an object
are not perceived at any given moment.
2.
Therefore an object exists with a minimum
(none?) of determinate qualities.
3.
It is therefore a general (universal).
4.
Given the existence of generals then,
consistency requires the existence of qualities, which are generals
independent of objects.
2.
Qualities are independent of the fact that a
material object possesses it.
a.
To hold otherwise is to deny law, and the
existence of all but individual facts, leading to a logical contradiction.
i.
If no law existed, but only individual facts,
the future would be entirely indeterminate and completely general.
ii.
Thus, only the instantaneous state would exist.
iii.
But if a law is fiction, instants are as well.
3.
Qualities are (partial) phenomena considered as
wholly independent monads (indivisible and without reference).
a.
Consider the sensible qualities of red, sour, or
tooth-ache (as in a pain).
i.
Each is indescrible except by its potentiality;
there is nothing more to be said about what pain is, except pain.
ii.
Pain is only pain and nothing more than pain,
without components or reference to other sensations.
b.
Qualities are monadic potentials.
i.
Qualities should not be considered with regard
to their existence.
1.
To exist is to have a place in the general
system of the universe, and therefore to have reference (see ii above), and
therefore not to be a quality.
2.
A determinate absence however, implies a
non-totality, (see i above) rather than a monad.
Is a quality a mind-independent or mind-dependent object?
ReplyDeleteAt the end of section 4, Peirce ends with “Anything whatever….would our senses only respond to it.” If we take Peirce’s words, a quality is a mind-independent object.
In Premise #1a, consider a red object in the dark. For Peirce, if we cannot see red color in the dark, then the color red is outside of our mind. With the word “respond”, it implies that we have the capacity to sense color. For empiricists, color is secondary quality, not a primary quality. It seems like Peirce attempts to blend primary qualities with secondary qualities. If we are in the dark, we assume that space exists. Why not color?