Commentary (Comte): Is the adaptability of mind responsible for the onset and propagation of positivism?

Question:

Is classification of the natural sciences under positive philosophy based primarily on the adaptability of knowledge and understanding in conforming to new principles, both in the transition to positivism and in its propagation?

This question first refers to the premise stating that the criteria for classification cannot be founded on faculties of the understanding, presumably because in practice, this could lead to a divergence of opinion and no firm ground for a positive classification scheme (36). While Comte mentions failed or misguided attempts at reaching this kind of classification up to his time, he does not really emphasize how the understanding of an observed fact, and the wealth of knowledge that may have already grown out of it, should adjust to embrace the demands of positive philosophy – namely, the orientation of that knowledge of phenomena towards general principles. He calls the development of ideas corresponding to a more specialized science, when they do not account for a beginning principle that presupposes all others, an “irremediable evil” (62).

Yet, knowledge stemming from an observable fact can still flourish even if the scientist is unaware of a principle from another science that precedes it; a current principle within a single science can suffice to provide the framework for that particular fact. Redirecting or even sacrificing the principle of a phenomenon for a more general principle, after the scientist had already discovered a fact without having said general principle in mind, in effect changes the understanding of that phenomenon. To restructure knowledge in the pursuit of positive philosophy is dependent in this sense on faculties of the mind, since knowledge would need to adapt or make some kind of calculated concession to obtain a more rational framework for the phenomena it apparently failed to organize properly before. Accordingly, the complete reorganization of acquired ideas, while incredibly difficult, would be the surest way to reach positivism (63).

A direct study of the natural sciences and the knowledge we obtain from them, in order to be of use to us, need to be pulled back to the principles of positive philosophy. Ideally, scientific discoveries should be made with the same framework that can anchor all knowledge of phenomena; this relates to the premise of the argument outline pointing out that theory is the basis for classification. For us to derive value from an observed fact, it should coincide with a theory (5), and if this theory becomes universal through the efforts of positive philosophy, then the prior ideas or principles attached to phenomena would need to be re-envisioned to conform to that modern theory. The adaptability of knowledge suggests how positive philosophy can be accepted even in the midst of a plethora of details collected through the historical progression of science, so long as our understanding can constantly reconcile new phenomena and discoveries with common principles.

This adjustment of the understanding of phenomena does appear relevant in transitioning to a positive system of classification, which is ultimately intertwined with the corresponding history of the sciences and of the development of mind (59). Comte would uphold the turbulence that comes with restructuring knowledge as a necessary element of history that is aiming towards positive philosophy; adaptability of knowledge of phenomena is crucial in actually transitioning to this philosophy.

However, the direct study of sciences with the goal of rationally classifying them and propagating them seems to permit traces of theological or metaphysical thinking, especially at history’s transition to positivism. As specialization and specificity of principles increase, precision of the science decreases (60). While Comte notes that precision does not indicate certainty, the certainty is still bound to the “degree of precision of which the corresponding phenomena admit” (61). Thus, there is a greater need for specialized sciences to be related back to general principles to protect them from an open-endedness that could most easily be penetrated by theological or metaphysical assumptions. For the classification system under positive philosophy to thrive, relationships must be continually sought out as discoveries are made. The continual pursuit of knowledge will augment how we view relationships between phenomena.

This time though, when the positive philosophy becomes well-established, knowledge would not have to be restructured to conform to a different principle as was needed at the transition to positivism; rather, subsequent knowledge is absorbed more readily into a common set of principles. In this sense, there is always some degree of adaptability either in the theory itself or in the percept grounded in the theory, which both must be connected to the broader picture. This adaptability nicely coincides with Comte’s emphasis on history, which he says propels positive philosophy to a level of sophistication that breaks free from theology and metaphysics (11), because of the progression of our stages of understanding. Our understanding of phenomena therefore still seems to play a role in classification and differentiation of the sciences, when it is being realigned to positive principles.