Peirce Commentary

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Can a concern for morality ever truly be exaggerated?

 

In Peirce’s argument concerning “The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism, he concludes that “An exaggerated concern for morality can impede scientific progress” (44).  While many can agree that too much of anything is no good, and therefore may find that Peirce makes a valid argument, I cannot seem to reconcile with his conclusion. This argument of extremes goes back to Aristotle’s idea that too little or too much of anything isn’t good. He believed there needed to be a happy medium. This concept makes sense when applied to most ideas but there are still certain areas where I would disagree. For example, is it possible that a mother love her child too much? Is it possible that a husband care for his wife too much? When we apply this idea of exaggerating to emotional terms or ideas, it seems that it presents itself as a problem.

 

The word morality is defined as being the “principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong, or good and bad behavior.” Given this definition it is safe to say that the word morality entails some emotional notions. We decide not to do “morally wrong” things because of how they make us or others feel. Whether or not these emotions stem from a religious background is irrelevant. You don’t need to be a Christian to know that it’s wrong to intentionally hurt those you love. Religion does not create conviction, nor does the fact that “men are raised according to a certain tradition” account for the feeling of guilt, or concern. Of course, certain traditions and beliefs are passed down from generation to generation, but this in itself should not dismiss any truth behind it. Where did the first idea of right and wrong come from? If we reduce these beliefs we have so grown accustomed to be merely traditions that we have been conditioned to live by, then how can we explain the “emotional ties” one has, even from a child, to issues concerning morality? And so it is due to this that I do not agree with the first premise of Peirce’s argument. Morality has to be more than just tradition but an innate notion, an instinctual kind of “habit” not a “conditioned” one.

 

In Premise 2, Peirce states “morality is essentially conservative”, and in the following premises goes on to say that this conservatism is detrimental to advancements in science. When Peirce explains the idea that conservatism causes one to be hesitant about questioning morals, and in therefore, in other words, we’d be hesitant about exploring things scientifically, I couldn’t help but think about Socrates. In many of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates is seen defining virtues with his interlocutors. One of the virtues he often mentions is “Sophrosyne” , which in Greek is the virtue of self-control.  To have this virtue, according to Socrates was not just an admirable thing, but it was something he encourage all to acquire.  When one is learning to have self-control, it’s important to know when to stop, when enough is enough, or when satisfying a certain curiosity is not worth the potential damage it can do. In other words, morally conservative attitude would be a cautious one. And while this cautiousness may lead to delayed or slow advancements in science, one can never be too cautious just as one can never love too much. Given this idea I am forced to reject Premise 2 and those that follow it.  Morality may seem to be unfavorable to science only because it forces one to “think twice” before making a step. But it is this hesitancy that allows for better decision making, that in the long run, would benefit all sides of the spectrum.