Saturday, June 9, 2012

Prolegomena §56

Conclusion:
The aim of metaphysics should be to derive, purely from reason, principles that are unified, and that regulate rather than constitute objects of cognition.

“Although an absolute whole of experience is impossible, the idea of a whole cognition according to principles in general must impart to our knowledge a peculiar kind of unity, that of a system, without which it is nothing but piece work and cannot be used for the highest purpose (which is always only the system of all purposes).” (350)

Premises:
1. The endeavor for systematic principles will distinguish metaphysics as a science.
     a. Pure reasoning is capable of satisfactory answers because we are the ones who conceptualize the ideas, and the only problems we encounter in pure reasoning come from our manner of conception (350). Those problems are independent of experience and relatively easy to solve, and will thus allow metaphysics to establish foundations and move forward.
     b. Because pure reasoning does not involve any of the conundrums that arise from empirical reasoning, such as the inconceivability of an object, or the agnosticism on the nature of things in themselves, the focus on pure reasoning will prevent metaphysics from degenerating into a dialectic which pervasively allowed reason to vary on the same issue, and which constantly used empirical reasoning when it should not have been used (351).

2. The unity of the mode of cognition should not be derived from the object of cognition.
    a. It is impossible to have an absolute unity of experience; though it is possible to have a unity of cognition (350). Judgments (on the constitution of objects) that require experience therefore will not improve our cognition, since they will usually have a subjective slant.
     b. Pure reason can give us a unified understanding of objects, as it does not rely on experience.(350).

1 comment:

  1. Premise 1b makes me realize a few things that have bothered me in trying to understand Kants metaphysics, that pure reasoning is idealistically a priori is for sure because it's so stressed that it will not rely on experience, but as i said that is "idealistically." The way I see it, as low mass as they may be, even thoughts should be in some respect influenced by the laws of nature i.e. gravity and the like. Does kant truly believe that any sort of "pure" reasoning is actually possible? that is, reasoning without reference to experience? The reason i was reminded of this, is it seems that the agnosticism on the nature of things themselves have been relatively untouched post-kant's critique. the agnosticism remains in tact, even within Kant's own writings, and we have indeed "degenerated into a dialectic which pervasively allowed reason to vary on the same issue" just within Kant's understanding of the "boundaries" of reason, which i suppose he believes to have arrived at out of the use of pure reason. i guess im just starting to wonder about the capacities of pure reason and if they are as Kant says, or whether or not these things are possibly a priori at all, seeing as even thoughts have a place in space-time...

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