Question:
Can there be a unity of experience solely based on homogeneity, through the sensible word, that actually aids reason in overlapping or at least bridging experience and objects that transcend experience so that reason can ultimately establish its own kind of experiential unity?
This question primarily refers to Premises 2d, 2e, and 3b, to point out that causality is linked to both experience as well as that which is beyond experience, and that the totality that reason encompasses, while it refers to experience, still attributes all things to something outside experience. This essentially summons causality in both phenomenal and noumenal realms, but reason finds its application useful only when unifying actual experiences, even if it falls short of attaining “the absolute completeness of their series” (82/349). The issue of natural necessity, as pertaining to experience, is interesting because it does not necessarily imply that a ground for unity must be found outside its own domain to things in themselves. Rather, causality, when applied to experience, implies that in homogeneity every object will both be an effect and a cause; thus, as all experience is confined in a single domain, its objects relate to each other in an infinite recursion to obey the universal principle of cause and effect.
This recursion, albeit chaotic in that there is no unconditional cause (or freedom) invoked, nonetheless depicts the totality of experience with a certain level of unity as a system. However, through this account, experience still seems to catalyze its own movement towards what is outside experience by reaching its own totality, or actually pointing to things in themselves (88/354), since the totality of experience is not within experience. Thus, while unity appears to be granted within experience via an infinite recursion of causality, such a phenomenon merely paves the way for reason’s striving to meet the boundaries of experience, but to make this possible suggests that reason is aware of the former unity and rejects it to implement its own unified totality of experience.
In this sense, there is a fluid movement from the infinite recursion grounded in experience alone to a unity that more strictly relates both sides of the boundary of experience, and this implies a significant overlap between these two distinct domains. This kind of overlap seems necessary for reason to know how to gauge and define its bounds, since ultimately objects beyond experience are being referred to through causality regardless of whether we move from experience to beyond experience (as with infinite recursion) or vice versa.
Furthermore, causality does not uniquely belong to experience since transcendental objects are also being subjected to causality insofar as they are related to the sensible world and all of its connections (95/361). The possibility of a Supreme Being, which “although not in the series of experiences is thought for the purposes of experience” (83/348) shows that reason transcends experience and yet is anchored by it to be of use to us, and that these transcendental objects by virtue of their relation to the world are not rendered as completely empty concepts. These concepts are in some ways illuminated to us when reason pushes beyond its bounds, and through the relation of causality we have some grounds to infer their nature. Thus, in order to understand both sides of the boundary, cause and effect cannot be limited to either one.
With regards to the initial infinite recursion within experience, Kant would probably say that such an event would mean there are no limits in experience, and that our pure concepts of the understanding would only set in motion the relationship between objects that we eventually are not able to cognize. Therefore, he may reject such a notion altogether to say that reason would have been able to unify experience all along; moreover, the lack of limits in experience does not necessarily imply a smooth transition towards reason striving to attain its bounds.
Reason, as the primary force behind this unity, needs to set limits for itself to define its bounds (94/361). Limits must persist in experience so that reason can mediate transcendental objects with objects of experience through a given relationship, rather than having experience haphazardly transcend itself with no regulation. Kant could also say that there is no other unity prior to reason especially if reason is the mediator that must relate the inner and outer sides of the boundary of experience, in which that relationship is causality. Ultimately though, from my critique, there can be a greater degree of overlap between these domains that is necessary for reason to know what kind of experiential unity it must permit.
This question primarily refers to Premises 2d, 2e, and 3b, to point out that causality is linked to both experience as well as that which is beyond experience, and that the totality that reason encompasses, while it refers to experience, still attributes all things to something outside experience. This essentially summons causality in both phenomenal and noumenal realms, but reason finds its application useful only when unifying actual experiences, even if it falls short of attaining “the absolute completeness of their series” (82/349). The issue of natural necessity, as pertaining to experience, is interesting because it does not necessarily imply that a ground for unity must be found outside its own domain to things in themselves. Rather, causality, when applied to experience, implies that in homogeneity every object will both be an effect and a cause; thus, as all experience is confined in a single domain, its objects relate to each other in an infinite recursion to obey the universal principle of cause and effect.
This recursion, albeit chaotic in that there is no unconditional cause (or freedom) invoked, nonetheless depicts the totality of experience with a certain level of unity as a system. However, through this account, experience still seems to catalyze its own movement towards what is outside experience by reaching its own totality, or actually pointing to things in themselves (88/354), since the totality of experience is not within experience. Thus, while unity appears to be granted within experience via an infinite recursion of causality, such a phenomenon merely paves the way for reason’s striving to meet the boundaries of experience, but to make this possible suggests that reason is aware of the former unity and rejects it to implement its own unified totality of experience.
In this sense, there is a fluid movement from the infinite recursion grounded in experience alone to a unity that more strictly relates both sides of the boundary of experience, and this implies a significant overlap between these two distinct domains. This kind of overlap seems necessary for reason to know how to gauge and define its bounds, since ultimately objects beyond experience are being referred to through causality regardless of whether we move from experience to beyond experience (as with infinite recursion) or vice versa.
Furthermore, causality does not uniquely belong to experience since transcendental objects are also being subjected to causality insofar as they are related to the sensible world and all of its connections (95/361). The possibility of a Supreme Being, which “although not in the series of experiences is thought for the purposes of experience” (83/348) shows that reason transcends experience and yet is anchored by it to be of use to us, and that these transcendental objects by virtue of their relation to the world are not rendered as completely empty concepts. These concepts are in some ways illuminated to us when reason pushes beyond its bounds, and through the relation of causality we have some grounds to infer their nature. Thus, in order to understand both sides of the boundary, cause and effect cannot be limited to either one.
With regards to the initial infinite recursion within experience, Kant would probably say that such an event would mean there are no limits in experience, and that our pure concepts of the understanding would only set in motion the relationship between objects that we eventually are not able to cognize. Therefore, he may reject such a notion altogether to say that reason would have been able to unify experience all along; moreover, the lack of limits in experience does not necessarily imply a smooth transition towards reason striving to attain its bounds.
Reason, as the primary force behind this unity, needs to set limits for itself to define its bounds (94/361). Limits must persist in experience so that reason can mediate transcendental objects with objects of experience through a given relationship, rather than having experience haphazardly transcend itself with no regulation. Kant could also say that there is no other unity prior to reason especially if reason is the mediator that must relate the inner and outer sides of the boundary of experience, in which that relationship is causality. Ultimately though, from my critique, there can be a greater degree of overlap between these domains that is necessary for reason to know what kind of experiential unity it must permit.
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