Conclusion: The Idea consist of the absolute universal and is not of the particular
or individual but creates the unity of the particular through notion and of the
exhibition of the notion as “external existence”. (170/213).
“The Idea is truth in itself and for itself… Its
“ideal” content is nothing but the notion in its detailed terms; its “real”
content is only the exhibition which the notion gives itself in the form of
external existence, whilst yet, by enclosing this shape in its power, and so
keeps itself in it" (170/213).
Premises:
1. The Idea
is totality or absolute (170/213).
2. The Idea is not of a single individual,
conception, or external object but every “actual thing” that is true, is the Idea
(170/213).
a)
Every actual thing gains its truth within and by the Idea (170/213).
b)
Every individual being is only one aspect of the Idea (170/213).
3. The Idea should not be confused with a
singular idea (170/213).
4. The Idea is the one universal substance and
at the same time it’s “genuine actuality” is the mind (170/213).
a)
The Absolute, which is the Idea, is
the universal one idea (170/213).
b)
Through “judgment” this one idea breaks down into the system of specific ideas
(170/213).
c)
These specific ideas are “constrained by their nature” to where truth is for
them, which is within the one idea (170/213).
d)
In the process of judgment and reconstitution the Idea first, is the one universal substance, and second,
in actuality it is to be such as
a subject, i.e. mind (170/213).
5. The Idea is not a logical form (170/213).
6. The Idea is not an
abstraction within itself but “essentially concrete” (170/213).
a)
Concreteness is created by the free notion birthing character to itself and in
turn the character becomes reality (170-171/213).
7. The Idea is in
every consciousness and therefore something present within this “mortal sphere”
(171/213).
8. Notion is realized
by the internal collectivity of all individual beings and their relation to
each other (171/213).
a)
the individual does not correspond to its notion alone (170/213).
b)
the notion should never be considered a specific notion (170/213).
9. The Idea can be described in many ways (ex.
Reason, object-subject, infinite-finite) because it contains all the
relationships of understanding (172-173/214).
10. The Idea is the dialectic that makes
understanding and diversity know their finite nature which brings the diversity
back into a unity (172- 173/214).
a)
Understanding makes two “misunderstandings” 1) it takes the extremes of the Idea as abstractions instead of the concrete unity it is. 2) that the “self-identical” Idea contains contradiction
or an external reflection which does not lie in the Ideal itself. (172-173/214).
11. The Idea is essentially a process and runs
through three stages of development (174/215).
a)
First, the idea is in the form of immediacy (172-173/214).
b)
Second, the idea is in the mediate form of Knowledge (172-173/214).
c)
Third, the idea is the Absolute Idea
(172-173/214).
12. The purpose of
Philosophy has always been to make certain of the Idea (172/213).
a)
The proof of the Idea is contained in
the whole history of Philosophy (172/213).
b)
Idea is the result of this historical
dialectic (172/213).
I have been wondering how the Idea relates to what I say about the relation between Being and Notion in the logical argument posted above this one. Above in the conclusion, the description of its ideal and real content sound very similar to the Notion and Being, but the Idea being a totality, most likely has like a formal relation to Notion and Being (N and B being the particulars, while the Idea is the universal). Could they, however, be more related then that? Perhaps even different names for the same thing?
ReplyDeleteHegel states in the opening lines to the chapter on "The Idea" that, "The Idea is truth in itself and for itself--the absolute unity of the notion and objectivity", from there he goes into the paragraph that I have used above as a direct quote. Though he talks much in this section about notion, he does not however supply much information as to what he means the "objectivity" to be. It perhaps could very well be synonymous with "being", but so far with Hegel I'm skeptically of any term being synonymous for another. The above conclusion focuses on the universal nature of the "Idea" and what the "Idea" is NOT rather than the more ambiguous definition of what exactly it is, the "unity of Notion and Objectivity" or Absolute Truth. It may be the case of different terminology for the same thing, none the less I do believe that there is a deeper relation than just particulars -> universals. #4 above may give some hint to this as seeing the "genuine actuality" of the "Idea" as the mind.
ReplyDeleteBrent, (I may be getting ahead of myself here but) since the premises focuses on what the idea is NOT (for the most part), and freedom is not mentioned do you think the idea to Hegel is equivalent to freedom or at least an aspect of the idea or do you think the idea leads to freedom?
ReplyDeleteWell, Pamela your certainly ahead of me. I must say that I might be the last person to answer this question and what ever I'm about to say is perhaps a guessing opinion at best as I'm still trying to wrap my head around it all.
ReplyDeleteHowever, I think this Idea does have some form of freedom involved with it, but then Hegel states (4c in the outline) that particular ideas which I believe we are apart of are constrained by "their own nature". When he says this I feel that there is not absolute freedom in regards to the particular ideas that succumb to the absolute Idea.
I guess it comes down to what type of freedom your talking about, an absolute freedom, a spiritual freedom, a civic freedom? Maybe some body else can add to this to help answer your question a bit better.
Going back to Billy's question regarding the relationship between the Idea, the Notion, and the Being, it really got me thinking that there is some strong similarity between the Idea and the Notion to the point of seeming to be one in the same, the key word being seeming. From what I've gathered in this passage, I feel like the Idea is the Notion become concrete, the subject and the object, the Notion and the Being, becoming one. I can see how this does not imply a synonymous relationship as Brent says, however the Notion and Being are certainly cornerstones upon which the Idea stands.
ReplyDelete