503-512
Conclusion:
Moral
subjectivity is just a single individual, and it may or may not correspond to
the Good.
“This supreme pitch of the
'phenomenon' of will — sublimating itself to this absolute vanity
— to
a goodness…. involves the nullification of the universal-collapses by its own
force…. hold
its own against the good, and of the good, which would only be
abstract.” (512/273).
Premises:
1.) Moral
subjectivity ought to commit to the Good; it shall look after not only its own
interests/rights but also to the general welfare, the social goods.
a.) Welfare without right is not a good.
b.) Right without welfare is not the Good.
c.) The combination of the two is equivalent to the Good.
d.) Subjectivity partakes in the Good.
2.) Moral
subjectivity asserts its right to autonomy--to be the judge of itself what
shall count as right or wrong. What it takes to be right may end up opposing the
Good. [509/272]
a.) Subjectivity
makes the Good private: the Good becomes his goods, not social goods, serving only
himself.
b.) Moral subjectivity is on the verge of
slipping into wickedness.
3.) Moral subjectivity or conscience
contains both the Good and the wickedness. (511/273)
a.)
Subjectivity may take over by the wickedness and may do something contrary
to the Good.
b.) A good may be non-objective and
non-universal.
c.) Subjectivity becomes the judge
for itself.
4.)
Wickedness can work against subjectivity, and thus works against the Good.
a.) It leads to perversion and annihilation of the
subjectivity, itself. (512/273)
5.) The actions of the subjectivity may
not correspond to the Good.
Ok so from what I am understanding, it seems that the driving force of this argument is that because Moral Subjectivity can lead to self destruction, it has potential to be both good and wicked. In Premise 2, it states that the Subjectivity makes the good private, hence "itself" becomes the judge and decides What is good according to it's interest. The "itself" in all cases seems to be the main factor, which leads me to question how the "general welfare" relates to this process at all. It looks like Moral Subjectivity, by nature, can never truly correspond to the Good, because any "Good" perceived BY "itself" would be only because it seems to be what is Good FOR itself.
ReplyDeleteI'm curious as to Hegel's exact definition of what Wickedness is or where exactly it comes from? As I understand it, this Wickedness is used in Hegel's schematic as a counter in the dialectic with the good creating a more conscious individual that helps to push a collective of individuals towards the 'Good'. However, wouldn't this make Wickedness necessary? Does that mean that all beings must possess a certain 'nature' of wickedness in them if so?
ReplyDeleteFrom my understanding to Hegel's insight on what he calls "Moral consciousness" is a sense of duty as essential reality; it sees itself as realized in the fulfillment of duty.
ReplyDeleteHegel argument is since consciousness is rational, it is also moral as if whatever is moral is rational. Moral action is real because it fulfills duty and based on Hegel insight on the subject; the essence of moral action is pure duty. This leads me to come up to the same conclusion mentioned in the blog above that moral subjectivity or consciousness at the end may or may not correspond to the good as long as it fulfills the action of pure duty.