Conclusion:
Reason can lead us, via analogy as it regards the
relations between the phenomenological and noumenological, to the boundary of
possible experience.
“But this limitation does not prevent reason from leading us
to the objective boundary of experience, viz., to the reference to something
which is not itself the object of experience but must be the highest ground of
all experience” (59/362).
Premises:
1)
The boundary of experience cannot be understood
through experience (59/360).
a)
Experience can know only perception and the
intuitions that make experience possible.
b)
Experience cannot tell us anything beyond
appearances.
2)
There must be something beyond the appearances
we know through experience (59/360).
3)
Reason functions through relations of ideas; its
goal is internal coherence between ideas.
4)
Reason is meaningful only within the confines of
possible experience.
- All reason external to possible experience operates on the assumption that we know things as they are in themselves.
- We cannot know things as they are in themselves.
- All reason external to possible experience operates on the assumption that we know things as they are in themselves.
- We cannot know things as they are in themselves.
5)
The boundary between the knowable (possible
experience) and the unknowable (noumena) is still cognizable based on the
relations between the two fields.
-Boundaries are positive cognitions, not mere negations (59/361).
-Boundaries take part in both fields, what is within and what is without
(59/361).
- Relations tell us the relation between things without making claims as to the nature of the things in themselves (59/361).
-Through analogy we may know the relation between the unknowable and the knowable, without knowing the natures of these things in themselves (59/361).
-Through analogy we may know the relation between the unknowable and the knowable, without knowing the natures of these things in themselves (59/361).
-The boundary of possible experience can be understood via these relations that intersect the two fields (59/361).
The main problem for me in Kant's argument here, was reconciling with the idea of even being able to state that there even exists a boundary, although experience cannot support such a claim. We create ideas and judgments of things based on our experiences of them, but if we cannot experience them, what can justify our ideas of these unexperienced things existing? After reading your argument outline however, Kant's argument seems to make more sense to me. The use of the word "analogy" allows me to dismiss the idea that we have no premise to even consider things as being outside or beyond experience. From what I understood, it isn't the "experience" that warrants such an idea but rather our "reason". And so your premise stating that "Relations tell us the relation between things without making claims as to the nature of the things in themselves", brought light to the fact that we don't need to know the "two fields" in order to understand their relations. While this idea makes sense in concept, when I attempt to apply this concept to more simpler things it doesn't seem to work. Is it because this idea can only make sense when applying to metaphysics since we still don't "KNOW" what lies beyond those boundaries? In other words, because we still don't know the thing in itself? Or maybe you can give me an example where knowledge or experience of two things isn't necessary to understand their relations.
ReplyDeleteI had similar difficulties when trying to apply that kind of relation outside metaphysics. Reason is still able to cognize the actual boundary, and I think the boundary comes from the notion that whatever is experienced must comprise some ultimate unity that connects all experience (or reflects the totality of experience) and this must be outside experience itself. This “empty space” as Kant calls it will compel reason to think of forms rather than things in themselves (94/361) and so all we can do is draw a relationship between the two sides of the boundary to organize experience that way.
ReplyDeleteI might be incorrect, but it seems like that premises 1b and 2 are contradictory to each other. If experience cannot enlighten us beyond the appearance then, how can anything beyond appearance acknowledge us through experience? Maybe I am just getting confused with the wordings. Kant also did not say that the appearance is an illusion, but do you think if it is transcendental then, can't it be considered partially illusional?
ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
ReplyDeleteIs Kant trying to restrain reason to make room for faith? He gives us the boundary analogy. He claims that reason can only stay within its proper bounds. If it goes beyond these bounds, it produces confusion for itself. Reason can only know the appearances, not the things in themselves.
ReplyDelete“We are not at liberty to abstain from inquiring into what things in themselves may be, even though we cannot obtain a definite notion of what things in themselves are.” 986/352)
“We think an immaterial being, a world of understanding and a Supreme Being even though we can never know them as in themselves because in them only, as things in themselves, does reason find completion and satisfaction” (89/355).
If you add these two quotes from section 57, the analogy and the concept of things in themselves to your existing premises, would you agree that Kant tries to make room for faith and other metaphysical concepts. It seem like Kant is under Hume’s spell—he tries to bring faith and God back in the background—he tries to put a slightly different form of metaphysics back into the picture once again. Thus, Hume’s skepticism is overcome. Does he really solve the Humean problem? It is only a suggestion.