Conclusion: The idea of God is inseparable from thought in that it must be a notion. The transition from being into notion (or conceptualization) i.e. self-knowing, is God. Self knowing, or this union between notion and Being is the most real reality
"God... expressly has to be what can only be 'thought as existing'; His notion involves being. It is this unity of the notion and being that constitutes the notion of God." (165/51)
Premises:
1: God is defined as the most real of beings. (160/49)
2: Every defining term is a negation of immediate reality.
a. In the transition from sensation into notion, the phenomenal is transmuted into the universal,
and "when it receives the stamp of universality at once loses its first and phenomenal shape." (162/50)
b. In other words, once the immediate is conceptualized it loses it's immediacy.
c. The defining of God reduces Him to an abstract.
3: The only appropriate term for the defining of the most real of real things is Being. (160/49)
a. Being, as a definition, is itself an abstraction
4. God cannot be proved using phenomenological premises based on contingent realities. (164/51 a."Merely animated nature is, at best, incapable of supplying the material for the truthful expression of the idea of God." (164/51)
b. The most adequate starting point in a proof of God is in the nature of the Spirit
5. The notion is necessarily a reference back on itself.
a. In other words, to have a concept, one must be able to make a reference to being. (165/51)
6. Being is not truly actualized if it is not able to reference itself.
a. It is merely something which is supposed to be, "like that of the paper lying before me." (165/51)
7. It is the faculty of thought which allows Being to transcend contingent sensory things into universal notions.
a."Suppose now that this fullness of being passes under the agency of thought. Then it is stripped of its isolation and unconnectedness, and viewed as a universal and absolutely necessary being which determines itself and acts by general purposes or laws. And this necessary and and self determined being, different from the being at commencement, is God." (160/49)
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ReplyDeleteIn this selection, how does Hegel’s conclusion tie-in to the notion of reason? In §52, Hegel states that conceptualization (the transformation of being into notion) is Reason. He states:
ReplyDelete"And the result of all is that Reason supplies nothing beyond the formal unity required to simplify and systematize experiences; it is a canon, not an organon of truth, and can furnish only a criticism of knowledge, not a doctrine of the infinite…thought is only the indeterminate unity and the action of this indeterminate unity" (Hegel 165-166 §52).
Does reason simply constitute the formal bond between being and notion (God)?
Reason serves as a "formal unity" as he says which "systematizes experience" for thought which inevitably must go outside itself. He says right before that quote that you just mentioned that although it's continually termed reason, for him it is simply abstract thinking. I think he would more likely say that it is "thought" which is important in the going outside itself, but reason is just a term that he calls back upon for some continuity for Kant. If there is a solid equivalency between Reason, and thought, and notion, I would say that in some sense the faculty of reason in that it can tranform being into notion would then be a means to understanding God. It seems that he might even say that it is God. Such grand statements! Of course this hinges on Reason being solidly identifiable with the terms he explicitly uses, notion and thought.
ReplyDeleteNow that i think about it, he would probably say that Reason is just one form of the greater notion or Idea, the grandest scale of this Idea being the one that IS God. I think he would say that Reason is a means to understand a some parts of God but not the whole picture, which could only be understood by the totality of the notion of which Reason is just one form. That's some sexy stuff. Or maybe I'm wrong...
ReplyDeleteIt seems that you state in your conclusion two different definitions for the term "Self-knowing". First you say the transition from being INTO notion is Self-knowing. But then you say Self-knowing is a UNION between notion and Being. Perhaps I'm mistaken but I see transition from one thing to another and the union of two dissimilar things to be quite different from each other.
ReplyDeleteI also notice that Hegel (and this could be a contradiction on his part) states that, "their union (notion and Being) is the Ideal of Reason (160/49). However, he does not use this terminology elsewhere in the readings.
How can God be an abstract thought? Thought and being are different. God is a being, and thought is the notion or idea of something that exists. Therefore, God is a thought of an existing supreme being and cannot be thought differently. The theory of faith claims that the thought of God cannot be inseparable from His being.
ReplyDeleteIf God exists, he is in the world, the ultimate reality—he must be in it. Hegel resolves God into itself or the world, and God is substituted by itself. God becomes part of the world and reduces to a primary concept or notion. In this sense, Hegel’s view is irreligious. In contrast, If God is the absolute idea or the ultimate reality--the whole, all other things are parts of the whole; then, God has to be in it if it wants to manifest itself in the ultimate reality. God needs the ultimate reality like us and all other things.
ReplyDeleteI think that I may have been confused in this argument in that I did not take into account the context. I think it's possible that he is saying that this view of God is the one that appears when Reason is used to interpret the world as almost a critique of other philosophers, and does not represent his own view, but on that too i may be wrong. I dont see that much of a difference myself between union and transition into, a transition between paragraphs will help them become unified, the transition from man to werewolf is a union of the beings, they are still seperate concepts, but become unified by their transition into each other. As stated earlier, i think the appearance of this unfamiliar language might have to do with me confusing his argument as a diagram of what Reason does.
ReplyDeleteWell, when it all comes down to philosophical language I think every word counts. I do see a big difference from one thing transitioning into another vs. two things becoming united. Especially since you essentially say that being transforms into notion, as in one thing becomes the other. Where as the other refers to two things becoming something completely different together, which is a union. I know a fine point but I feel it is a big one that makes your argument seem contradictory. The examples you give above seem more syntactical than actualities of the point. One counter example I'll give is water transitions into vapor through evaporation; mud is the union of water and earth. Nonetheless, I understand the difficulty with Hegel's language, a mean the man has his own dictionary for Christ sake.
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DeleteI'll concede that clarity is lost somewhat in the distinction between the two terms, but they are both terms Hegel uses in this particular passage in very similar contexts, suggesting similar meanings. While you make a good point as to the differences, what unifies water vapor and water is evaporation, and what transitions between earth and water is mud. These examples dont wholly get to the heart of the matter however, because even if transition and union are differentiated between, they are not contradictory, I would argue that they are at the least compatible terms, with more similarities than most two words of different meaning that you could put up next to each other. the criticism is certainly valid, i've just never been a fan of dabbling in semantics, though as you have stated, my argument could be more clearly stated if i had overcome my aversion.
DeleteI guess we'll have to agree to disagree Billy. Again it's a fine point and I encourage you to read your counter examples above to see if they really make sense. All the same I blame this on Hegel as his use of language could have been much tighter.
Deleteok i guess were at an impasse, but i'd like to see an example of a transition that is not unifiying between two things, in fact i would say all transitions are inherently unifications of sort. a transition implies 2 different things that move into eachother, while thats not definitively a union, it certainly hints at one and an ideal transition would be a union. again i suppose were agreeing to disagree, i just think that saying its contradictory due to a slight difference in the literal meaning in the terms is taking it too far
ReplyDeleteOk, well we can take away the contradiction and I would say it is at least a poor statement that conflicts with each others meaning. I'm still holding that transition is not a union even if you feel that which helps to transition is. For instance, driving a manual transmission car we transition from 1st to 2nd gear but I don't see that being a union of 1st and 2nd gear. I think the problem is in your above statement that you believe a transition implies two different things moving into each other, I would certainly call this a union. But I maintain a transition is going from one thing to another thing where the two things not becoming one, but one thing becoming another thing without producing a by product (which if it did may be considered a union).
Deletethat point is well taken! makes a lot of sense when you explain it like that, if you see it as one thing becoming another thing with no presence of that previous thing remaining that certainly does weaken my argument, however i think that the way Hegel uses transition is less clear cut, and implies a certain union. even on the section on the idea he uses transition and unity side by side in a sentence, synonymously. however i think we have beaten this argument to a pulp and both stated our sides quite clearly, i am not sure if we can progress much further haha, the last point does make more sense to me however
DeletePerhaps a Commentary in the waiting: as to why Hegel should consult a dictionary more often than not.
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