Pierce--Unidealistic Philosophy

Conclusion:

Peirce rejects unidealistic philosophy and holds a fallibilist view: he attempts to prove that the fallibilist view is much better than the unidealistic view.

Every unidealistic philosophy supposes some absolutely inexplicable, unanalyzable ultimate;….To suppose the fact 

absolutely inexplicable, is not to explain it, and hence this supposition is never allowable. (229)

Premises:                                                                                                                                                                   

 1.) What is unidealistic philosophy?        (229)                                                                                                                                                                       

a.) Idealism is the view that everything that there is, is mind, mental or an idea.

b.) This form of idealism comes close to George Berkeley’s form of idealism, “to be is                               to be perceived” or “esse est percipi”.                          

                                                         

2.) For Berkeley, the only way we could know anything about the reality was to experience it through our senses.                                                                                                                             

a.) If something could not be perceived through our senses, we would not be able to say whether it existed or did 

not exist. 

3.) Peirce’s idealism is broader: he holds the view that everything that there is, is cognizable.

                 a.) Everything that is real can be thought and can be an object of cognition.

                 b.) Unreal things/entities cannot be thought and cannot be an object of cognition.

c.) For Peirce, unidealistic philosophy is defined as, there are things/entities in reality that cannot be the object of cognition or of an idea.

i.) There are things/entities in reality that no human being could ever think about, so we could not understand them.

ii.) If things/entities in reality cannot be the object of cognition, they are beyond the comprehension of human mind or mental ability.

d.) Peirce holds that Descartes’ philosophy, in particular, is “unidealistic.”                                                                             

i.) If we adopt Descartes’ philosophy, we cannot explain how the mind and body interact.

4.) Fallibilism is the principle that human beings could be wrong about their beliefs, expectations, or their understanding of the world--knowledge is neither absolute nor certain.

a.) In this sense, Peirce is a fallibilist philosopher.

b.) For Peirce, a hypothesis cannot serve as a hypothesis unless it can be verifiable or tested in future. (247)

                                                                i.) In this sense, Descartes’ philosophy cannot pass muster.

5.) Peirce states that we need “the notion of community” such as the scientific community if we want to do philosophy.

                a.) Under the notion of community, Descartes’ philosophy is doomed to fail.

                                i.) Descartes’ philosophy assumes that knowledge is certain.

ii.) Descartes’ philosophy also assumes that we don’t need a community in order for us to know what knowledge is.

iii.) Descartes’ philosophy cannot explain how the mind and body interact.

6.) There are many facts which Descartes’ philosophy “not only does not explain, but renders absolutely inexplicable, unless to say that ‘God makes them so’ is to be regarded as an explanation.” (228)

a.) Unlike unidealistic philosophy, we cannot use “God makes them so” as an explanation—this is not allowed.

                 b.) A fallibilist view is verifiable, but an unidealistic view is not.

i.) In philosophy, Pierce’s fallibilist view is superior to an unidealistic view.

                                                               

Peirce-“Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” 228-250

Conclusion: Some Cartesian propositions like that of complete doubt, have failed to achieve certainty.  These consequences serve as a further test to that uncertainty.

“These propositions cannot be regarded as certain; and, in order to bring them to a further test, it is now proposed to trace them out to their consequences. We may first consider the first alone...” (230.)

Premises:

1.Cartesian philosophy begins with absolute universal doubt (228).

          a. we are unable to obtain knowledge from looking within ourselves (230).

          b. all knowledge is to be derived from external facts

2. Total skepticism is not a good start in the study of philosophy (228).

          a. facts previously in place are there because it was agreed upon without a reason to

             question (228).

          b. doubt should arise with reason to doubt (229).

          c. those who follow Cartesian philosophy are trying to restore beliefs previously released,

              rendering it counterproductive (228).

3. Acceptance of this proposition forces us to discard of all knowledge of the external world based on our self-consciousness (230).

           a. diversity and multiple viewpoints will be disregarded and a single mode favored to

               maintain uniformity in the study.

          

4. A single mode of action of consciousness is to be chosen to utilize logically when

              interpreting the external world (230).

           a. the chosen mode is to be reliable, unquestionable and what most closely resembles

               external facts (230).

4. This proposition limits greatly not only the knowledge we have thus far acquired but the knowledge we are still seeking.

Peirce: "The Essentials of Pragmatism" (251-268)

Conclusion:

Belief, insofar as it is free of doubt, leads to actions such that reflecting upon them increasingly reinforces their character; this fixed character is perfected when there is no more self-control and self-reproach over those actions.

“That ultimate state of habit to which the action of self-control ultimately tends, where no room is left for further self-control, is, in the case of thought, the state of fixed belief, or perfect knowledge.” (258)

Premises:

1. Belief is a relatively enduring habit of mind, rather than a mere whim of consciousness (257).

2. Doubt is the lack of this habit, but manifests itself as a “condition of erratic activity” (257).

3. Belief, as an enduring habit, influences and leads to actions.

4. In order for belief to lead to consistent actions, doubt must be relinquished.

5. However, these actions are being mediated by self-control, not arbitrarily, but in such a way that they tend towards a fixed character (257).

6. This fixed character is identified through the wane of self-reproach (257), where self-reproach can be considered a form of doubt.

7. Reflecting upon an action after it has already taken place can diminish the feeling of self-reproach (257).

a. This reflection is a necessary element in initiating the action at a later time (257).

8. Subsequent reflections of the action, when it is being repeated at later times, will increasingly diminish self-reproach.

9. As the action is repeated, its character becomes more clearly distinguishable and fixed.

a. Since the character of the action is being increasingly fixed, self-control over that action also diminishes to a greater degree (257).

10. The perfection of the fixed character of action is marked by the entire absence of self-control and self-reproach (257). 

The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism by Peirce 42-59

Conclusion:

An exaggerated concern for morality can impede scientific progress.

“Yet in more ways than one an exaggerated regard for morality is unfavourable to scientific progress. I shall present only one of those ways.” (44)

Premises:

1. A system of morals is the traditional wisdom of the experiences of past ages.

            a. Men are raised to behave according to this tradition.

2. If a man behaves in a way that is counter to this, his conscience troubles him.

a. As a result it is not safe for him to question his morals and we see that morality is essentially conservative, leading him to be imbued with conservatism (44).

3. This conservatism is a habit, and it a property of habits that they tend to spread to other areas of a person’s life (44).

            a. As such, moral conservatism can lead to conservatism about any opinions of a speculative kind.

4. This way of thinking is detrimental to scientific advancement and thus morality can be unfavorable for science. 

What is a Quality? (Peirce, pp.84-87)

Conclusion: Qualities are monadic universals which exist without reference to parts or anything else, which need not be instantiated in particular objects, but rather exist as abstract potentialities.

“A quality is a mere abstract potentiality…considered as a monad (85-7).”

Premises

1.       Qualities are independent of mind in the form of sense or thought.

a.       Consider a red object in the dark.

b.      Its ability to transmit certain light (and thus to be perceived red) does not change because the darkness prevents this light from being perceived. Redness is therefore independent of its being sensed.

c.       To think otherwise, is to hold one of two positions, both of which still admit sense-independence: either that the body assumes opposite properties upon these conditions, or that its properties are indeterminate.

                                                                           i.      In the former case, to ascribe opposite properties to a substance under these conditions (such that, for example, a red object in the dark would absorb, rather than reflect red light) is still to believe that objects have sense-independent qualities, albeit ones for “which there is no ground for believing in (85).”

                                                                         ii.      The latter case, the belief that bodies become indeterminate regarding qualities not perceived, is to admit the existence of generals (universals), and therefore, to be consistent, the existence of qualities independent of their particular instantiation.

1.       The majority of qualities inherent in an object are not perceived at any given moment.

2.       Therefore an object exists with a minimum (none?) of determinate qualities.

3.       It is therefore a general (universal).

4.       Given the existence of generals then, consistency requires the existence of qualities, which are generals independent of objects.

2.       Qualities are independent of the fact that a material object possesses it.

a.       To hold otherwise is to deny law, and the existence of all but individual facts, leading to a logical contradiction.

                                                                           i.      If no law existed, but only individual facts, the future would be entirely indeterminate and completely general.

                                                                         ii.      Thus, only the instantaneous state would exist.

                                                                        iii.      But if a law is fiction, instants are as well.

3.       Qualities are (partial) phenomena considered as wholly independent monads (indivisible and without reference).

a.       Consider the sensible qualities of red, sour, or tooth-ache (as in a pain).

                                                                           i.      Each is indescrible except by its potentiality; there is nothing more to be said about what pain is, except pain.

                                                                         ii.      Pain is only pain and nothing more than pain, without components or reference to other sensations.

b.      Qualities are monadic potentials.

                                                                           i.      Qualities should not be considered with regard to their existence.

1.       To exist is to have a place in the general system of the universe, and therefore to have reference (see ii above), and therefore not to be a quality.

2.       A determinate absence however, implies a non-totality, (see i above) rather than a monad.

Commentary (Comte): Is the adaptability of mind responsible for the onset and propagation of positivism?

Question:

Is classification of the natural sciences under positive philosophy based primarily on the adaptability of knowledge and understanding in conforming to new principles, both in the transition to positivism and in its propagation?

This question first refers to the premise stating that the criteria for classification cannot be founded on faculties of the understanding, presumably because in practice, this could lead to a divergence of opinion and no firm ground for a positive classification scheme (36). While Comte mentions failed or misguided attempts at reaching this kind of classification up to his time, he does not really emphasize how the understanding of an observed fact, and the wealth of knowledge that may have already grown out of it, should adjust to embrace the demands of positive philosophy – namely, the orientation of that knowledge of phenomena towards general principles. He calls the development of ideas corresponding to a more specialized science, when they do not account for a beginning principle that presupposes all others, an “irremediable evil” (62).

Yet, knowledge stemming from an observable fact can still flourish even if the scientist is unaware of a principle from another science that precedes it; a current principle within a single science can suffice to provide the framework for that particular fact. Redirecting or even sacrificing the principle of a phenomenon for a more general principle, after the scientist had already discovered a fact without having said general principle in mind, in effect changes the understanding of that phenomenon. To restructure knowledge in the pursuit of positive philosophy is dependent in this sense on faculties of the mind, since knowledge would need to adapt or make some kind of calculated concession to obtain a more rational framework for the phenomena it apparently failed to organize properly before. Accordingly, the complete reorganization of acquired ideas, while incredibly difficult, would be the surest way to reach positivism (63).

A direct study of the natural sciences and the knowledge we obtain from them, in order to be of use to us, need to be pulled back to the principles of positive philosophy. Ideally, scientific discoveries should be made with the same framework that can anchor all knowledge of phenomena; this relates to the premise of the argument outline pointing out that theory is the basis for classification. For us to derive value from an observed fact, it should coincide with a theory (5), and if this theory becomes universal through the efforts of positive philosophy, then the prior ideas or principles attached to phenomena would need to be re-envisioned to conform to that modern theory. The adaptability of knowledge suggests how positive philosophy can be accepted even in the midst of a plethora of details collected through the historical progression of science, so long as our understanding can constantly reconcile new phenomena and discoveries with common principles.

This adjustment of the understanding of phenomena does appear relevant in transitioning to a positive system of classification, which is ultimately intertwined with the corresponding history of the sciences and of the development of mind (59). Comte would uphold the turbulence that comes with restructuring knowledge as a necessary element of history that is aiming towards positive philosophy; adaptability of knowledge of phenomena is crucial in actually transitioning to this philosophy.

However, the direct study of sciences with the goal of rationally classifying them and propagating them seems to permit traces of theological or metaphysical thinking, especially at history’s transition to positivism. As specialization and specificity of principles increase, precision of the science decreases (60). While Comte notes that precision does not indicate certainty, the certainty is still bound to the “degree of precision of which the corresponding phenomena admit” (61). Thus, there is a greater need for specialized sciences to be related back to general principles to protect them from an open-endedness that could most easily be penetrated by theological or metaphysical assumptions. For the classification system under positive philosophy to thrive, relationships must be continually sought out as discoveries are made. The continual pursuit of knowledge will augment how we view relationships between phenomena.

This time though, when the positive philosophy becomes well-established, knowledge would not have to be restructured to conform to a different principle as was needed at the transition to positivism; rather, subsequent knowledge is absorbed more readily into a common set of principles. In this sense, there is always some degree of adaptability either in the theory itself or in the percept grounded in the theory, which both must be connected to the broader picture. This adaptability nicely coincides with Comte’s emphasis on history, which he says propels positive philosophy to a level of sophistication that breaks free from theology and metaphysics (11), because of the progression of our stages of understanding. Our understanding of phenomena therefore still seems to play a role in classification and differentiation of the sciences, when it is being realigned to positive principles.