Comte 46-57

Conclusion: In a hierarchy of sciences, the simplest classification is that of the study of the phenomena of inorganic bodies as having greater facility to positive philosophy than the study of the of the phenomena of organic bodies. (p.52,53)

Premise 1: In order to get a positive categorization of sciences, one must determine its relevance in the comparison of "the various orders of phenomena." (p.51)

-That is to say, there is a hierarchy of sciences that can be determined by its importance in other sciences. (i.e. "the laws of astronomy influence those of all other phenomena, but the laws of other phenomena do not influence those of astronomy," [p.54] this is Comte's explanation of why astronomy is higher than terrestrial physics in the classifications)

Premise 2: This order is determined by the degree of simplicity of the phenomena concerned. (p.52)

Premise 3: The simplest phenomena are a priori also necessarily the most general, or least complicated by others.

-"For whatever is observed in the greatest number of cases is for that reason disengaged to the utmost degree from the circumstances peculiar to each separate case." (p.52)

Premise 4: We must begin, then, with the study of the most general or simple before proceeding to special or complex phenomena.

Premise 5: The first division of natural phenomena is between the study of the phenomena of inorganic bodies and the study of the phenomena of organic bodies.

-"A first glance at the aggregate of natural phenomena leads us to divide them at a start... into two great principle classes: the first... inorganic bodies, the second... organic bodies." (p.52)

Premise 6: The phenomena of organic bodies are more complex, and thus less general.

Premise 7: The phenomena of organic bodies are dependent upon the phenomena of inorganic bodies, and not the other way around.

Premise 8: There is no need to ask if the two classes of bodies (inorganic, organic) are of the same nature because it is not relevant to positive philosophy which does not study the nature of things. (p.53)

Commentary: What is the extent of true knowledge?

Question:
What is the extent of true knowledge of our understanding and conscious processes?

The actual form of truth can only be its scientific system. Thus, philosophy must be part of science, that would include not just love of knowledge but also an actual knowledge. Some say that one does not necessarily have to understand the meaning of absolute, but feel and behold it. Hence when studying science, one should not just be governed by one's understanding but one should also feel, contemplate and be inspired by it.

Furthermore, the form of science and its systematic development includes a universal sign of clarity. Philosophy is esoteric (573/336), comprehensible, applicable for teaching and learning. Rational form of science is open to all and through the same path of rationality, it leads to the reasonable knowledge of the mind. The rational mind is the thought, and the universal “I” in general (381/237). Thus the esoteric philosophy values the rational reflective thinking, definite concepts and their determination.

Moreover, human cognition is sometimes considered as a tool that brings things out of darkness into the light of consciousness, and as a result, it (i.e., consciousness) processes and measures them. Knowledge can be considered as the environ through which individuals are able to observe things. The laws of this medium is altered by things; in which case, we do not know and will never know what they are. Although, we know just how they are to us or how we have to consider them. Both views at the knowledge are false; they are based on the dualistic doctrine. According to this doctrine, things and thinking, objectivity and subjectivity, things and consciousness, absolute and knowledge, are separated from each other. However, the duality is broken on the fact of progressive knowledge, because there is a movement from the fallacious to true knowledge.

Nevertheless, one may argue against the view that our own consciousness and direct experience are known to us. Since, what well-known is not necessarily mean that it is indeed known. Merging these two concepts may lead to self-deception, which may as a result interrupt the path of truth. And again, the truth is not a minted coin, which is given thus it could readily be put in the pocket.

Natural consciousness is only the concept of knowledge, but it is not real knowledge (47). This concept is the purpose of consciousness itself. It has to experience the reality of all of its knowledge or the truth of the acquired knowledge. Thus, it is necessary to compare the desired and achieved goals. Consciousness in itself is compelled to experiment with itself. And as a result, constant maintenance of all of these experiments would produce different results from the initial goals and assumptions.

At the heart of the development of consciousness, there is a feature that assimilates the truth, but since it may consist of nothingness, it faces its own rejection. The path is through the mind of doubt and despair, even if the consequence of the results is nothing but the consciousness of nothingness of all the results (47). Phenomenology itself, demonstrating the path certainly is applied to the total extent of knowledge in skepticism. This concept should not be taken nihilistically, as though all truths are reduced to zero. Inasmuch as, it is about a certain truth, which is experienced and endured, then acknowledges the finite and ceases. In the conclusive, it does not turn into zero, but transfer into a new and higher truth. Hence, the loss of any particular truth is the attainment of a new, and ultimate truth. The progress of knowledge has a negative character in the sense of the dialectical negation of the previous stage; via denying the transition ahead. However the path forward may not be futile and inane, since the limit that mind accomplishes would be the goal where it attains its peace and contentment.

Nevertheless, the phenomena of consciousness are like velamens that become more and more transparent. The consequent result should produce what underlies all these phenomena and actualizes them. Particularly, it is knowledge as such, pure, open, absolute knowledge. Here the subject is the notion and the notion equals to subject; they both match each other perfectly. Further, the subject must conform to its concept as an ideal. Consciousness is the same for itself, its own concept. Thus, consciousness must eventually return to itself. This result is an authentic knowledge of the consciousness of itself, i.e., its true identity.

Human life can be compared with the dialogue, as with the age, our views on people and things alter. This involuntary, but required alteration would be the lifetime experience of an individuum. Therefore, Hegel noted the course of development of consciousness, as the word dialectic or dialectical movement. This dialectical movement of consciousness progresses in itself as well as in its knowledge. As for consciousness, it follows the new true process of experience.

Commentary on “The State”

In the commentary entitled “The State” the commenter included five main arguments or requirements for a Hegelian state. These main premises consisted of 1) that the State is established by a constitution, 2) the constitution is the collective will or spirit of a nation, 3) to maintain unity of citizenry love is applied to the family within civil life, 4) love in the family is rule of law in the State obtained through reason, and 5) rules of law allow for “objective freedom” (§535-540/p284-289).  It is important to note that Hegel’s use of “objective freedom” means the free participation within the over-arching laws that help the collective State be (§539/ p287).

I will set aside objections for Hegel to account for abuses in the State based on individual freedoms or inequalities, as I believe that Hegel was philosophizing on the ideal State. However, what if a state in all its totality has all of the above premises within its barriers but instead of producing a productive and exemplary State creates a horrifying manifestation of evil so great that it changes the history of humanity as never seen before in the modern age. How does Hegel account for such, when a state meets his requirements yet fails at goodness?

It might come as a shock to Hegel that the example I speak of comes ironically from his own homeland. It would seem that Nazi Germany would fit Hegel’s requirements of a State. It certainly had a constitution that exhausted the collective triumphant will or spirit of that nation at the time. Though love in its Hegelian use is a strange notion and seems ambiguously defined, it still appears that it was applied in its Hegelian sense on a universal level to the white German citizenry. Despite how abominable it may be now, there was still a line of reason that ran through the German nation at that time. Finally, it had an overwhelming amount of “objective freedom” so much so that a whole nation was prepared to offer the ultimate sacrifice for the collective whole of the State.

Despite how we see Nazi Germany today, prior to 1939 (and I believe many a historical scholar would agree) Nazi Germany was the embodiment of Hegel’s State. The only problem is that where convention would lead most of us to believe goodness would prevail, Hegel’s system turned upside down and evil subsisted.

Hegel may argue that Nazi Germany became an “individual subject” and lost its collective whole under the authoritarian leadership of the ruling party. Meaning that its constitution was so called, hi-jacked, gave way to a monarch-like ruling that made the “self” the main unit of state and not the collective whole (§329/p. 302, 291-292).

He could also answer in another direction by stating that Nazi Germany was as much a part of the historical dialectic as anything else. Needed so much as to propel humanity forward, allowing us to gain a self-awareness and universal consciousness that we did not carry prior to 1939. In short, he may argue that the independence of enslaved colonial nations, the addressing of civil rights for all in the freest of nations, and a new social morality was obtained through this part of the dialectic for all of humanity.

Classification of the Positive Sciences (35-45)

Conclusion: Positive philosophy must rationally classify the positive sciences in a way that truly naturally represents them and their connections by studying them directly.

"We must now determine . . . that which is the most suitable rational classification of the different fundamental positive sciences"  (35)

"The classification must proceed from a direct study of the objects to be clasified, and must be determined by the real affinities and natural connections that they present" (37)

Premises: 
In order to study and classify the sciences, they must be homogeneously positive (36)
     There is a satisfactory level of homogeneity in the sciences to properly classify them (37)
 We cannot use any criteria stemming from faculties of the mind and understanding (36)
     They are all constantly at work anyway and therefore play no part in differentiation (36)

All positive sciences can be broken down into two fundamental pieces: theory and application (38)
    
We need only look to theory to classify the positive sciences (38)
     Theory lays the groundwork, course of action, and is even the cause of any practical scientific application (38)
     The theory behind a science is conceived before the methodology (40)
     We need only look at the theories behind different sciences to properly classify them (42)

http://philo218sum2012.blogspot.com/2012/06/hegel-540-281.html

4a) Sovereignty belongs only to the state.

Hegel argues that sovereignty is only a feature of states, that a people by itself never posses such a quality. This makes up part of Hegel’s overall suggestion that a monarch, the epitome of rational government, has absolute power over its people. In justifying the absolute authority of the monarch, Hegel attempts to dismantle the idea of a “sovereignty of the people”, a legitimate right of the people to oppose their ruler. If such a sovereign right exists among the people, than the political state must be understood as a balancing act between these two legitimate forces. Hegel imagines that such a duality of legitimacy would limit the absolute right of the monarch, a possibility that Hegel opposes given his view that the monarch ought to be the absolute personification of the power of the state. A closer look at the concept of the sovereignty of the people shows us that the force behind the observable historical instances of popular sovereignty is none other than the force which grounds the authority of the state in Hegel’s metaphysical construction. This recognition will allow us to see the way in which the legitimacy of “the sovereignty of the people”, a force fundamental to the concept of the state, still allows for the monarch to be understood as absolute.

As Hegel views it, the idea of a sovereignty of the people is impossible. Hegel suggests that sovereignty is a property of states only, and thus cannot be applied to a people with out a governing body. Hegel further asserts that a people with out a government are an amorphous mass, an indeterminate conglomeration that cannot be thought to resemble the sovereignty of the state (p.294). While Hegel can define sovereignty however he likes, the true substance of his objection is his suggestion that a people cannot posses a meaningful self-determination.

This idea can be interpreted in two ways. First, as an observation regarding the tangible state of affairs, suggesting that a people can never be so determinate as to challenge their monarch without a state to provide order. The second interpretation, as an argument that a people never has any right, any legitimacy in challenging the will of their sovereign. The first proposal can be challenged on historical grounds. If short-lived, moments of popular sovereignty, or self-determination, have occurred and will likely occur again. Just last year we witnessed a surfacing of the sovereignty of the people in both Egypt and Tunisia, where masses gathered without formal order under the banner of a single demand. This ordered and determinate will, seen in these peoples, demonstrates the occurrence of moments in which a people act like a state, in a determinate fashion, without a state. The force behind the determinate quality of these masses, within Hegel’s metaphysical framework, would be the Spirit of the people, or the objective Spirit. The phenomenon of popular uprisings illustrates the existence of a force, in the form of Spirit, comparable to the notion of “the sovereignty of the people” Hegel suggests does not exist.

This first interpretation aside, it is necessary to ask whether a people ever has the right, or any legitimate claim, to oppose their monarch. To understand this interplay of legitimacy, the authority of the monarch must be traced back to its origins, to determine on what grounds the monarch himself derives his legitimacy. The monarch is in a position of authority, for Hegel, insofar as he represents the unity of individual existence, himself, with the concept of the state (542). The monarch’s authority is the authority of the state. The state is established by the constitution of a given nation, which is coextensive with the Spirit of that people (540). In this way the Spirit of a people establishes the state and grounds the authority and legitimacy of the monarch.

Based on this lineage of legitimacy it can be seen that the demand for sovereignty directed by the Spirit of the people in these historical moments of resistance is that same force which gives the state its legitimacy. As such, the legitimacy of the state is compromised when it clashes with the sovereignty of the people, not the other way around. Any change in the Spirit of the people, as is clearly seen in any popular challenge to the established monarch, amounts to a reciprocal change in the constitution of the nation and thus a change in the authority of the state. When the people of a nation come out in outright denial of the authority of a monarch, the Spirit of the people has changed, developed further, and now denies the state the authority and legitimacy it once imbued it with. Understood in this way, the monarch has no legitimacy in challenging the Spirit of the people, this Spirit understood as the driving force behind their challenges to his authority. Hegel cannot deny the sovereignty of the people, their right to oppose to their monarch; this sovereignty being grounded in the same entity that establishes the state.

Hegel offers an objection to this line of argument, contending that any infringement on the authority of the monarch, in the positing of an opposing and legitimate sovereignty, is a denial of the absolute nature of the monarch. As Hegel argues, the monarch must be absolute in order to be adequate to its concept, the concept of the state. (p. 296). This protest is answered when we note that the monarch’s illegitimacy in opposing the Spirit of the people is not a genuine limit to its power in the sense of a confinement or outside entity forcing the monarch to govern within a set domain. This condition, that his actions be aligned with the Spirit of the people, does not bar him from any specific actions, only in acting in such a way as to estrange his own basis of legitimacy; his authority is absolute in this way. The monarch is only prevented from creating a contradiction in his own authority, least his authority be alienated from that which grants its legitimacy.

Given this internal force capable of opposing the monarch, we may still understand the monarch as both absolute and adequate to its concept. This check on the monarch’s authority is the same check that applies to any state, to the concept of the state itself; no state can deny the force that establishes and grounds it. The monarch’s legitimacy is as absolute as any state’s legitimacy can be. In this way the monarch, possessing authority to the extent that a state may have authority, is entirely adequate to its concept. Ultimately the seeming limitation to the monarch of the recognition of the sovereignty of the people amounts to nothing more than an internal check against logical inconsistency. The Spirit of the people must act in a way consistent with itself. In this way both the absolute nature and adequacy to the concept of the state are preserved in the monarch despite the existence of the sovereignty of the people.

Comte, Positive Philosophy pp 57-67

Conclusion: Revision of the encyclopedic scale is to take place to further clarify the positive classification of the fundamental sciences and its relationships.

“The revision of the encyclopedic scale, undertaken in this way at the commencement of each of the five great sciences, should make the scale itself more exact and its soundness more evident.” (58)

Premises:

1. Positive philosophy is comprised of five different sciences: astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, and social physics (57).

       a. The first four are sciences developed which affect all other phenomena including social physics without being affected in return (57).

2. Distinctions between sciences developed separately are to be made and the distinction is to be made rationally not only empirically (58-59).

3. The actual development of natural philosophy is to be followed (59).

      a. The study of general sciences is vital in developing more focused sciences. This allows a natural order to develop that does not have a preceding science depend on a specialized science.

4. The perfection of the different sciences is to be present in classification (60).

     a. Precision is not to be confused with certainty

5. Each science must have a plan of study (61).

     a. Certain sciences require the knowledge of others to avoid holes in intellectual development

Commentary: §321-329 It is a citizen's duty to go to war and defend this individuality of the state from foreign states.

 The question then is why is it a citizens duty to go to war to defend the individuality of a state?

    

The premise refers to the bond of an individual to that of the state he is part of. As being part of that state, you should have an obligation to protect that state of it individualism from outside entities such as foreign states in order to preserve its individualism.

What makes an individual a citizen? The book definition is a legal recognized subject or national of state or commonwealth, either native or naturalized. It is agreeing to live in a particular state and follow its law. When you decide to inhabit a state and agree to follow its laws, in return, one should try to protect the individual rights and welfare. Essentially, it is a contract.

The individuals of a state are what make up that state. Every individual brings life and character, which encompasses a state.  The state is in actuality, a part of the individual. Since the state is in part, part of the individual, they should protect the state with its life as if it were their own. Even if that should result in all out war.

The sacrifice of one’s self to the state in order to protect its individuality acts as a bond or tie to that state. A subset of this premise is sacrifice on behalf of the state's individuality is a substantial tie between the state and its members (325/300). With this tie, it is only natural to state that the individual becomes part of the whole that is the state. In addition, one should feel obliged to want to protect something that is a part of them.

It is also said to protect ones state is to be courageous, and risking your life even in the face of certain death is necessary. Hegel states that to be courageous is to be free. By sacrificing yourself for the individuality of the state in itself is protecting the individuality of all citizens, this thought can be liberating. Giving one’s self for a higher purpose is self-gratifying no matter the individual motive.

With the contract between the individual and the state it is fair to say that one should want to protect what is believed to be in their best interest. In this inference, it is in the best interest of the individual to protect it states’ individuality from foreign states. This is important because as stated earlier the individual and the state have a bond, so ultimately by protecting the state’s individuality you are in return protecting the individual’s individuality as well.